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Honorable John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C., 20505

Dear Mr. McCone:

As you will note from the enclosed memorandum from the President, dated October 30, 1963, the guidance developed by the Committee on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning has been approved. There are also enclosed copies of:

- (a) The President's memorandum of January 9, 1963, initiating the undertaking;
- (b) The Committee's report to the President, dated October 24, 1963; and
- (c) The Guidance for Non-Military Planning, developed by the Committee and approved by the President in the memorandum of October 30, referred to above.

We appreciated very much the contributions made initially by General [redacted] and later by his successor on the Committee, [redacted] as well as the valuable staff contributions from [redacted]

We are proceeding now to the next step--that of developing additional and more specific planning assumptions to meet the needs of particular non-military preparedness programs. I have solicited the views and requirements of the agencies having such assignments, and you may be sure we shall be looking to the Central Intelligence Agency for assistance as this second phase proceeds.

Sincerely,

E. A. McDermott
Edward A. McDermott
Director

Attachments

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

Honorable Edward A. McDermott
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

As we have discussed, I am interested in improving our planning for the management of our resources and implementing the necessary steps in the economic stabilization field during periods of national emergency. Such nonmilitary planning must be based on assumptions which encompass the entire spectrum of possible conflicts, including the possibility of general nuclear war.

Pursuant to Section 301, Executive Order 11051, I approve the establishment of an inter-agency committee under your chairmanship, with appropriate level representation from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, to provide assumptions on which such plans can be based.

The assumptions developed by this committee should be used by various Federal Agencies in developing plans in the nonmilitary preparedness fields. This will permit the departments and agencies concerned to proceed with their respective nonmilitary preparedness assignments on a common and consistent basis.

Please coordinate the work of this committee with the staff of the National Security Council.

/s/

John F. Kennedy

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your memorandum of January 9, 1963, the Committee on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning forwards herewith proposed assumptions for guidance in non-military defense preparedness activities.

We have sought to develop assumptions which are sufficiently specific to be useful to the many agencies concerned, yet sufficiently general not to require your frequent review as the facts on which they are based change, as they may be expected to do. In our judgment, except when major changes in posture or policy occur, the planned annual review of these assumptions will suffice to assure up-to-date guidance at this level.

We recognize that more detailed guidance is required as programs are planned and implemented by the several agencies to which you have assigned, by executive order, non-military preparedness responsibilities. Such guidance, as well as that required by State and local governments and various elements of the private sector, will be furnished by the cognizant agencies (chiefly, the Office of Emergency Planning and the Departments of State and Defense). It will, of course, be reviewed by the Office of Emergency Planning for consistency with the basic assumptions which you have approved. The Committee feels that the rapid completion of such second-stage guidance is urgently required as a follow-on to the basic assumptions submitted herewith. Only then can we achieve the improvements in planning for the management of resources and the implementation of necessary steps in economic stabilization in which you expressed an interest in your memorandum of January 9.

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Recommendations

1. That you approve the attached submission as guidance for non-military preparedness planning.
2. That you direct the rapid completion of auxiliary preparedness guidance, coordinated by the Office of Emergency Planning.

Respectfully submitted,

COMMITTEE ON ASSUMPTIONS
FOR NON-MILITARY PLANNING

(Signed)

Edward A. McDermott, Chairman
Office of Emergency Planning

(Signed)

Jeffrey C. Kitchen
Department of State

(Signed)

Thomas D. Morris
Department of Defense

(Signed)

Central Intelligence Agency

Attachment

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GUIDANCE FOR NON-MILITARY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

Various agencies of the U. S. Government have been assigned important responsibilities for emergency preparedness planning. While advance planning is needed for all emergency contingencies, the possible contingency of nuclear attack on the U. S. imposes a requirement vital to the nation's survival -- the planning in advance of appropriate measures to minimize the impact of such attack and to promote rapid post-attack recovery.

The needs of the several agencies for guidance for non-military preparedness planning vary widely. All, however, must take into account a range of possible future developments. In the great majority of cases, available National Intelligence Estimates make possible realistic judgments concerning these developments. In general, however, the estimates are such that planners must take recourse to certain assumptions in order to cover the range of possible contingencies. While agencies may require additional and more specific assumptions to meet particular planning requirements, a set of general assumptions is needed as a common basis for the guidance of emergency planning.

Although the purpose of this paper is to provide assumptions for non-military preparedness planning, it is not possible to treat the military and non-military aspects in isolation. For example, from a production and logistics standpoint, certain minimum civilian needs must be met in order to sustain the military effort. Moreover, military requirements must be established in the light of political objectives and, of course, political objectives depend in part on military capabilities to realize them.

The assumptions in this paper reflect the view that since it is not possible to foresee precisely what situations will arise, it is necessary to cover to an appropriate degree the entire range of possible crises and conflicts. The most practicable way to do this is to isolate major sectors of

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the contingency spectrum toward which planning should be oriented. Naturally, unpredictable future crises would have their own peculiarities, which would have to be taken into account and which could be significant in their effect. But for planning purposes, we believe that concentration on major contingencies will provide the most useful practical guidance.

While the estimates and assumptions in this paper cover the next five years, they are particularly applicable to the first two years of the period, with their degree of reliability decreasing throughout the projected time period. In order to keep them current, they will be reviewed and updated as necessary to reflect the impact of significant changes in estimates, objectives or capabilities. At a minimum, this review and updating will occur annually.

The assumptions are set forth in the framework of three contingencies.

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CONTINGENCY I (COLD WAR)

A CONTINUATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND
CONFRONTATION, WITH OCCASIONAL PERSISTING
CRISES OCCURRING EITHER SINGLY OR IN VARIOUS
COMBINATIONS

APPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS

1. International tensions are likely to continue throughout the next five years, with occasional acute crises such as Berlin and Cuba.
2. While intelligence is likely to provide at least a few days warning, such crises could erupt suddenly with no warning.
3. Localized warfare and internal wars are possible during the next five years in many areas, and are quite likely to occur in some. The possibility of U. S. involvement in any of these situations cannot be excluded.
4. U. S. participation in such conflicts could range from expanded military and economic assistance programs, to military advisory and quasi-combat functions (as in Vietnam), to limited commitments of U. S. combat forces. When the U. S. does become involved in these conflicts, it should not, for planning purposes, assume the availability of substantial direct assistance from nations not directly involved.

However, under such circumstances, material resources from non-Communist areas would remain generally available to the U. S. and its Allies.

5. Continuation of international tension and internal conflict in the underdeveloped world would require varying amounts of economic assistance, but would not create a significant impact on the overall U. S. resource position.
6. Assuming a continuation of the current world tensions, economic activity in the United States would continue its upward trend, with the trend line of gross national product rising from the 3 1/2 percent record of the last decade to an annual average rate of 4 percent towards the middle of the decade of the sixties.
7. Direct controls over the economy would not be generally required to meet situations arising under this contingency, although particular resources or services might require special attention.

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CONTINGENCY II (LIMITED WAR)

THE OUTBREAK OF A LIMITED WAR INVOLVING
U. S. GENERAL PURPOSE COMBAT FORCES ON
A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE

APPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS

1. The outbreak of a limited war involving U. S. General Purpose combat forces on a substantial scale is possible during the next five years, although it is less likely than a continuation of the current situation as noted in Contingency I.
2. Such a conflict would be likely to evolve out of a tense international situation that affords warning of the impending crisis, although it is possible that there might be little or no warning.
3. Such conflicts conceivably could involve U. S. forces in combat operations in widely separated geographical areas simultaneously for an indeterminate period.
4. Direct hostilities between the U. S. and non-Russian Communist forces, especially in Asia, are more likely than a struggle involving Soviet forces. The Soviet leaders are likely to be very cautious about using their own military forces against Western forces, especially in critical areas, unless they should feel that some Western action threatened the integrity of the Soviet bloc. Should Soviet forces become involved directly with Western forces, the Soviet leaders would probably use only that degree of force thought necessary to achieve local objectives and they would seek to prevent escalation of the conflict.
5. The possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in this contingency is not excluded.
6. Material resources from non-Communist countries outside the areas of combat would remain generally available to the U. S. and its Allies. In some limited war situations, however, there could for some resources be limitations on availability due to a desire to remain uncommitted.
7. Requirements for support of General Purpose forces, Army, Naval and Air Force, will continue to be met from a combination of equipment, replacement spares, and combat consumables on hand, supplemented as necessary by deliveries from industry during hostilities. Because of this combination of assets in the Department of Defense, net military requirements cannot be computed directly from force levels data. Civilian agencies therefore will look to

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the Department of Defense to compute that portion of the U. S. and Allied military requirements which must be satisfied by the civilian economy.

8. Limited war involving U. S. and Allied forces on a substantial scale could result in a situation where cooperative arrangements for mutual support of Allied civilian economies would be a necessity. It is difficult to give an order of magnitude for this assistance because of the infinite number of combinations of geographical, economic and political factors under which it might be called for, but its impact on the combined Allied resource position could be appreciable.

9. Under conditions of a conventional war that does not include an attack on the continental U. S., the U. S. gross national product growth trend, under the impact of a war economy and mobilization footing, would tend to rise more rapidly, as was the case in the years following the start of the Korean war.

10. The Government might be required to exercise controls over prices, wages, salaries, rents, and the allocation of goods and services. It is assumed that the President would request, and Congress would enact, whatever additional legislation might be needed in this regard, and that the public would accept manpower, resource, and other controls necessary to cope with these situations.

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CONTINGENCY III (GENERAL WAR)

SOVIET NUCLEAR STRIKES ON THE UNITED STATES

APPLICABLE ASSUMPTIONS

1. Deliberate initiation of general nuclear war by the USSR is unlikely during the next five years, but it is a possibility.
2. Warning of general nuclear war might range from several days alert to as little as 15 minutes warning for areas of first impact. The possibility of an attack occurring without warning cannot be completely discounted.
3. Co-incident with the attack on the U. S., the USSR would, as it considered appropriate, launch attacks by ground, naval, and air action against targets in Canada, Western Europe, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and the Far East.
4. It is not possible to predict the precise character or pattern of probable attacks, since the USSR has many options available, and since war could break out under various circumstances. However, it is assumed that military facilities supporting our nuclear retaliatory capability and centers of government, industry and population would be the principal targets of nuclear attack, with initial priority given to destruction of such nuclear retaliatory capability as could be profitably attacked. The possibility of a small-scale nuclear attack on the United States is very remote. The initial attack would probably be a heavy one, but emergency planning should take into account the additional possibility that weapons might be delivered in smaller follow-on attacks over the following days or weeks.
5. Availability of material resources to meet overall U. S. wartime and post-war requirements would be severely limited in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Resources of Africa and Latin America would probably be available, provided transportation were available.
6. The main problems following nuclear attack upon this country and overseas areas would be:
 - a. Survival of the population and emergency restoration and

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repair of essential facilities and transportation to sustain survivors;

b. Reconstitution of free world military forces as necessary to preclude or reduce further damage by the enemy and to terminate hostilities in a manner consistent with U. S. interests;

c. Reconstitution and rehabilitation of the fabric of the national society and economy; and

d. Assertion of effective U. S. influence on the reconstitution of order in other areas of the world, including former enemy territories, to the extent deemed necessary.

Within each of the above problem areas, there will be individual issues of extremely high priority arising from the unpredictable details of attack and the resulting damage.

7. Initial operations of general war will be fought and supported largely by forces and resources in being and in place. Pre-positioned war reserve stock for general war will be provided prior to D-Day and maintained for those forces with missions in the initial operations of general war.

8. Under conditions of a massive nuclear attack on the U. S., support for Allied civilian economies would be severely limited.

9. It is assumed that a nuclear attack on this country would not prevent the post-attack recovery of the United States, although effective management of some important elements of the economy might not be possible for several months following the attack. It is also assumed that damage to the economy would be uneven, with the resources in some areas escaping damage. Residual national economic capabilities in the post-attack period would be initially estimated by the National Resources Evaluation Center and the National Military Command System Support Center.

10. Extraordinary government controls over the economy would be immediately implemented under this contingency.

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11. Considerable shock, panic, and confusion would prevail in a nuclear attack situation. Negative behavior by a minority of the American public would find expression in such forms as hoarding, petty delinquency, absenteeism, opportunism, selfishness and hostility. There would also be present, however, strongly adaptive and constructive behavior on which could be based the initiation of planned measures to restore and sustain the morale of the American people.

Approved by the President,
October 30, 1963.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

I hereby approve for dissemination in the affected agencies the guidance submitted to me on October 24, 1963, in the report of the interagency Committee on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning. I would like this guidance to be reviewed and up-dated annually by the Committee.

As the report recognizes, the agencies responsible for certain non-military preparedness activities will need additional and more specific planning assumptions to meet their own particular requirements. These additional assumptions, however, must be consistent with the overall guidance I have approved.

With this in mind, I hereby direct that you, as Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, coordinate the early preparation of such additional guidance, with advice as necessary from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

/s/

John F. Kennedy

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
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NOV 1963

Honorable Edward A. McDermott
Director, Office of Emergency Planning
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McDermott:

There is attached a revised emergency line of succession
for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Faithfully yours,

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Attachment

LBK:drm (6 November 1963)

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